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When Remand is Appropriate in Multidistrict
Litigation
Edward F. Sherman*
INTRODUCTION
The 1968 Multidistrict Litigation Act (the “MDL Act”) created
the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the “Panel”) to transfer
multiple cases with “common questions of fact” to a single federal
judge for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.1
Transfer is authorized if the Panel determines that “transfers for
such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and
witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such
actions.”2 The transfer to a single district court is made without
consideration of personal jurisdiction over the parties and without
having to meet federal venue requirements.3 The transferee court
has broad authority to dispose of all motions and issues that arise
in the pretrial context, including all discovery matters and
dispositive motions such as those for dismissal and summary
judgment. The Act provides that: “Each action so transferred shall
be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such
pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred
unless it shall have been previously terminated . . . .”4 No
guidelines are provided for determining when “the conclusion” of
the proceedings occurs, and now, after almost fifty years of
practice under the Act, significant issues remain as to when
remand should take place.
I. SELF-TRANSFER AND LEXECON
For several decades after passage of the MDL Act, it became
an accepted practice for transferee judges to use the power under
section 1404(a) to transfer to a more convenient forum in order to
keep MDL cases in their district for trial or disposition.5 Writing in
Copyright 2014, by EDWARD F. SHERMAN.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
2. Id.
3. For an account of these developments, see Richard L. Marcus, Cure–All
for an Age of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use of the
Multidistrict Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245 (2008).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
5. See id. § 1404(a) (“For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought . . . .”).
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1978, Judge Stanley Weigel reported that “[i]n point of fact,
slightly less than five percent of the actions transferred by the
Panel have been remanded.”6 It remains true that the great majority
of cases are resolved in the transferee forum, and that most are
resolved by some sort of settlement.7 But over time, the practice of
transferee courts to dispose of the cases transferred to them came
into question.
From the start, there was a debate over whether transferring
cases under the Act should allow transferee courts to do more than
just prepare cases for trial.8 It was argued that the transferee judge
would develop expertise in managing the litigation that could be of
great benefit if that judge could hold on to the cases for trial, either
individually or in the aggregate. This view was reflected in the
practice of “self-transfer” that became dominant and was enshrined
in a Panel regulation.9 The debate over allowing transferee courts
to hold onto cases for trial mirrored the long-time debate over
whether to aggregate cases in the first place. The interests of
efficiency, economy, and consistency in resolution of like cases
were cited in favor of aggregation.10 In opposition to aggregation
were concerns for honoring the plaintiff’s choice of forum,
individualized due process, and the jurisdictional integrity of the
court where the suit was originally filed.11 That debate is still
ongoing, enhanced in recent years by court hostility to class actions
6. Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 583 (1978).
7. M. MARCUS, E. SHERMAN, & H. ERICHSON, COMPLEX LITIGATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 169 (5th ed. 2010).
8. See Stephen Scotch-Marmo & Michael James Ableson, At What Price
Efficiency? – Judicial Self-Assignment for Trial in Multidistrict Litigation, Prod.
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 934 (Aug. 25, 2014) (reviewing the
debate in the context of the passage of the Act).
9. The JPML has blessed self-transfer by Rule 14(b), which provides that
the Panel will not send a case back for trial if the district court handling pretrial
matters transfers the case to itself, and by case law holding that the JPML will
not even consider remanding so long as the district court is considering a selftransfer motion. See Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, Rule 14(b), 277 F.R.D. 480 (2011) [hereinafter Panel Rules]
(superseded, in part, by Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998)); see also In re CBS Color Tube Patent Litig., 342
F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (J.P.M.L. 1972) (“In view of the pendency of [a section
1404(a)] motion, we expressly refrain from granting this motion for remand and
interfering in matters within the discretion of the transferee judge.”).
10. Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The
Policy Issues, 10 REV. LITIG. 231 (1991) (comparing policies favoring
aggregation—such as economy, efficiency, and consistency of result—with
policies disfavoring litigant autonomy and fairness in individual treatment).
11. Scotch-Marmo & Ableson, supra note 8 (discussing congressional
testimony and court concerns over aggregation).
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and academic concerns over class action abuses.12 The narrower
debate over exactly when MDL cases should be remanded back to
their original jurisdictions is the subject of this Symposium.13
The self-transfer approach still had its limits. Self-transfer was
possible only if the transferee judge sat in a district in which a case
could originally have been brought. Furthermore, a high percentage
of all cases settle before trial, and that is especially so when the
MDL process—intended to foster settlement—is invoked. Thus, a
large number of transferred cases would always be resolved by
settlement accomplished under the jurisdiction of the transferee
court. Finally, transferee judges have authority to rule on all pretrial
matters, including dispositive motions such as motions to dismiss
and for summary judgment.14 Thus, transferee courts could dispose
of many of the cases transferred under MDL, obviating the need to
remand to the original district where they were filed.
Despite the broad acceptance of self-transfer pursuant to
section 1404(a), the Supreme Court held that it was improper in the
1999 decision of Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach.15 The Court concluded that the statutory requirement that,
at the completion of pretrial proceedings, the action “shall be
remanded . . . unless it shall have been previously terminated” did
not contemplate that transferee courts would hold on to cases past
the pretrial preparation stage.16 In Lexecon, the transferee judge
had resolved all but one of the claims by summary judgment.17
Over the plaintiff’s objections, the transferee court transferred the
case to itself for trial of that claim pursuant to section 1404(a).18
The defendant prevailed at trial, but the Supreme Court reversed
because the statute “obligates the Panel to remand any pending
case to its originating court when, at the latest, those pretrial
proceedings have run their course.”19 The Court rejected the
12. See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty:
Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 71 (2003); see generally Linda Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We
Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 Emory. L.J. (forthcoming
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2457429
##, archived at http://perma.cc/F9YW-UZ94?type=pdf.
13. For an edited and excerpted transcript of the discussions at the
Louisiana Law Review’s 2014 Symposium entitled “The Rest of the Story,
Resolving the Cases Remanded by the MDL,” see 75 LA. L. REV. 342, 342–97
(2014).
14. See text at notes 43 & 44, infra.
15. See 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
16. Id. at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. at 31.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 34.

458

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

defendant’s argument that the granting of the section 1404(a)
motion constituted a termination that obviated remand, and
concluded that the defendant “may or may not be correct that
permitting transferee courts to make self-assignments would be
more desirable than preserving a plaintiff’s choice of venue (to the
degree that § 1407(a) does so), but the proper venue for resolving
that issue remains the floor of Congress.”20
II. MEANS OF AVOIDING REMAND AFTER LEXECON
There are still ways for transferee judges to retain control of
cases by doing something comparable to a section 1404(a) transfer.
As the chair of the MDL Panel, Judge John G. Heyburn II, noted:
“Transferee judges are nothing if not resourceful where necessity
dictates and several appropriate strategies are available by which
the Lexecon conundrum may be avoided.”21 He provided the
following examples:
[P]rovided the plaintiff is amenable and venue lies in the
transferee district, the action could be refiled there. The
parties could also agree to waive objections to venue.
Alternatively, the transferee court could try a “bellwether”
case that was originally filed in the transferee district, the
result of which may promote settlement of the transferred
actions in the MDL. Another option, suggested in the
Lexecon opinion itself, is for the transferor court to transfer
the action back to the transferee court under § 1404(a). Still
another option would be for the transferee judge to follow
the action to the transferor court after obtaining an
intracircuit or intercircuit assignment.22
The first three techniques listed by Judge Heyburn have been
more fully described:
Prior to recommending remand, the transferee court could
conduct a bellwether trial of a centralized action or actions
originally filed in the transferee district, the results of
which (1) may, upon the consent of the parties to
constituent actions not filed in the transferee district, be
binding on those parties and actions, or (2) may otherwise
promote settlement in the remaining actions.
20. Id. at 40.
21. John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82
TUL. L. REV. 2225, 2233 n.47 (2008).
22. Id. (citations omitted).
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Soon after transfer, the plaintiffs in an action transferred for
pretrial from another district may seek or be encouraged (1)
to dismiss their action and refile the action in the transferee
district, provided venue lies there, and the defendant(s)
agree, if the ruling can only be accomplished in conjunction
with a tolling of the statute of limitations or a waiver of
venue objections, or (2) to file an amended complaint
asserting venue in the transferee district, or (3) to otherwise
consent to remain in the transferee district for trial.23
Most of these techniques require the consent of the parties or
the initiative of the plaintiff. They are thus not objectionable on the
grounds that they deny the plaintiff’s choice of forum or the
transferor judge’s authority over cases filed in his or her district.
The technique of having the transferor judge transfer a case back to
the transferee court under section 1404(a) can only be done if the
transferor court finds that the limited conditions for transfer to a
more convenient forum are satisfied.
However, one of the suggested techniques—the assignment of
the transferee judge to preside over the trial of the case in another
circuit—has been questioned. The use of intercircuit assignment of
transferee judges is an efficient way to allow the transferee judge
to sit outside his or her district and to preside over the litigation,
either as individual cases or in an aggregate trial. It has been used
to allow judges with special expertise or time in their docket to try
cases in a different circuit. It is particularly efficient in the MDL
context because the transferee judge has typically lived with the
litigation for a considerable period and developed extensive
knowledge and expertise in managing it.
This practice was challenged in an opinion by Chief Judge
Alexander Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices
Litigation24 In that case, Chief Judge Kozinski received a letter from
the Judicial Conference Committee on Intercircuit Assignments
asking him to sign a Certificate of Necessity that would permit the
transferee judge, Chief Judge Vratil of the District of Kansas, to
appear in his circuit as a visiting judge to try the MDL cases.25
Pretrial proceedings having been concluded, Judge Vratil had
notified the parties that to “facilitate trial in an efficient and timely
manner,” she would ask the Judicial Conference Committee to
23. Scotch-Marmo & Ableson, supra note 8, at n.61 (quoting 32-20P JAMES
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 20.132 (3d ed. 2012)).
24. See 711 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2013).
25. Id. at 1052.
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designate her to handle the proceedings.26 Such requests are often
granted routinely by circuit chief judges. The procedure for
intercircuit assignments is contained in guidelines issued by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, which
Judge Kozinski described as based on necessity:
A federal court in our circuit identifies a need for a visiting
judge for a case or cases pending in that court. The need may
be occasioned by a shortage of judges, or by the recusal or
disqualification of all of the court’s judges; it may concern a
single case or a multitude of cases; it may be for a single trial
or hearing, or it may apply to scores of them. If the need
can’t be satisfied by judges within the circuit, our Circuit
Executive and her trusty staff identifies a judge or judges
outside the circuit who are available and willing to serve. In
this effort, they’re immensely aided by the Judicial
Conference Committee on Intercircuit Assignments, whose
invaluable and frequent help I gratefully acknowledge. Once
a willing out-of-circuit judge has been identified, the chief
judge of the borrowing circuit signs a Certificate of
Necessity, which, not surprisingly, represents that an out-ofcircuit judge is needed for a particular case, location or time
period.27
The defendants objected to the request for assignment, and Chief
Judge Kozinski denied the request.28 He did not accept the
defendants’ objection that the procedure violated Lexecon as an
attempt to resuscitate the “self-referral” doctrine, saying that Lexecon
dealt with venue and not judicial assignment.29 But he found that the
request violated the Chief Justice’s guidelines for assignments:
[B]y signing the certificate, I’d be divesting Ninth Circuit
district judges of cases that would, in the normal course, be
assigned to them. Each of the cases was assigned to a local
district judge prior to the MDL transfer. It’s my understanding
that, when cases are transferred back to the originating
districts, they’re automatically restored to the dockets of the
judges to whom they had been assigned prior to the transfer.
Or, if the judge isn’t available, the case is assigned to another
district judge in that district, in accordance with local
procedures—generally calling for random assignment.
26. Order at *1–2, In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig.,
MDL No. 1840 (D. Kan. Feb. 2013); Scotch-Marmo, supra note 8, at n.2.
27. In re Motor Fuel, 711 F.3d at 1052.
28. Id. at 1052, 1054.
29. Id. at 1053–54.
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By signing a Certificate of Necessity for the cases in
question, I would, in effect, be removing the judges to
whom the cases were originally assigned and transferring
them to an out-of-circuit judge. I’m aware of no authority
empowering the chief judge of the circuit to re-assign cases
pending before other judges, or to remove cases from the
district’s assignment wheel. Only if the presiding judge is
recused or unable to serve, and the local district is unable to
reassign the case according to its local procedures, will the
chief judge of the circuit be called upon to bring in a judge
from outside the district. For me to sign a Certificate of
Necessity in the absence of such circumstances would
constitute a serious encroachment on the autonomy of the
district courts and also interfere with the random
assignment of cases.30
Chief Judge Kozinski viewed the Chief Justice’s guidelines as
“directed strictly toward meeting judicial necessities” and opined
that although “having the district judge who conducted MDL
pretrial proceedings also preside over the trial of the case can
improve judicial efficiency, preserve scarce judicial resources and
enhance MDL judges’ control over their proceedings,” there is no
authority for assignment to further those aims.31
Chief Judge Kozinski did add that the guidelines might be
amended to define the concept of “necessity” broadly and “thereby
give chief circuit judges latitude to seek intercircuit assignment in
these circumstances.”32 But the tenor of his opinion was that
intercircuit transfers based on efficiency could encroach on the
authority of transferor judges to resume rightful control over their
cases upon completion of pretrial proceedings. An indication of his
feelings in opposition to delaying remand can be found in his
dissent in a later-reversed Ninth Circuit decision upholding selftransfer in Lexecon. “Soon after the MDL process got underway,”
he wrote, “a peculiar thing started happening: [transferee] [j]udges
began to develop proprietary feelings toward the cases entrusted to
them . . . .”33 In Motor Fuel, he expressed the hope that his opinion
would “be the beginning of a productive discussion as to the
proper way to handle [such situations].”34 This is consistent with
30. Id. at 1054.
31. Id. at 1054–55.
32. See id. at 1055.
33. In re Am. Cont’l. Corp., 102 F. 3d 1524, 1540 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d by
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998)
(alteration in original).
34. In re Motor Fuel, 711 F.3d at 1055 (alteration in original).
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the movement that some believe is growing to require early and
routine remand of cases to transferor courts in the belief that
individual trials are superior to aggregative settlements.35
III .WHEN SHOULD REMAND OCCUR?
It is the Panel’s responsibility to remand cases. The process for
remand under the MDL Act is that the Panel will issue a
Conditional Remand Order (CRO) upon the suggestion of the
transferee judge—or upon motion by one or more of the parties or
at the Panel’s own initiative—that the case is ready for remand.36
Judge Heyburn, however, has said that when the transferee judge
suggests remand, “the party seeking to vacate the CRO faces an
uphill battle, as the Panel ‘gives great deference to a transferee
judge’s suggestion that an action pending before [that judge] is ripe
for remand.’”37
After Lexecon, the transferee judge must remand upon the
completion of pretrial proceedings.38 But exactly when is that? As
seen by the myriad ways that a transferee court can comply with
Lexecon and yet avoid immediate remand, the percentage of
remanded cases remains low. Given that most of the techniques to
avoid remand are not prohibited, a further question arises as to how
early remand should occur. The generally accepted answer has
been that a transferee judge should have considerable discretion as
to timing in order to accomplish the goals of MDL transfer. But
that view has been challenged more recently by contentions that
disaggregation of MDL cases is desirable to assure the right to
individual trials and preserve the jurisdictional interests of the
transferor courts.39 In opposition is the view that early remand is not
35. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75
LA. L. REV. 399 (2014).
36. See Panel Rules, supra note 9, at Rule 10.2 (“Upon the suggestion of the
transferee judge or the Panel’s own initiative, the Clerk of the Panel shall enter a
conditional order remanding the action or actions to the transferor district court . . .
(i) The Panel may, on its own initiative, also enter an order that the parties show
cause why a matter should not be remanded.”).
37. Heyburn, supra note 21, at 2235.
38. See generally Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,
523 U.S. 26 (1998); see also Panel Rules, supra note 9, at Rule 10.1 (“Where
the transferee district court terminates an action by valid order, including but not
limited to summary judgment, judgment of dismissal and judgment upon
stipulation, the transferee district court clerk shall transmit a copy of that order
to the Clerk of the Panel. The terminated action shall not be remanded to the
transferor court and the transferee court shall retain the original files and records
unless the transferee judge or the Panel directs otherwise.”).
39. See, e.g., Scotch-Marmo, supra note 8.
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required if the objectives of MDL pretrial transfer may still require
the control of the transferee judge. This is essentially a policy issue
only loosely governed by the MDL statute. The starting point is
when it can be said that the pretrial objectives of MDL have been
met.
A. When Common-Issue Discovery Is Completed
Supervision of discovery was a main impetus for the MDL Act.
The electrical equipment price-fixing conspiracy that resulted in
the much-publicized prosecutions of high-level corporate officials
in the early 1960s brought an unprecedented avalanche of trebledamage antitrust actions in the federal courts.40 Some 2000 suits
were filed in 35 different districts. Because the suits were in
different districts, Rule 42(a) consolidation was not possible.41
Moreover, section 1404(a) procedures for transfer to a more
convenient forum were inadequate to ensure that all the cases
could be transferred to a single court. The courts were therefore
forced to cope with the burden on an ad hoc basis, giving impetus
to the creation of the Coordinating Committee for Multiple
Litigation of the United States District Courts, composed of nine
federal judges, which supervised nationwide coordinated discovery
for all electrical equipment cases. Out of this experience came the
1968 Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, which created
the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer cases with
“common questions of fact” to a single federal judge “for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”42
A consideration by the Panel in determining whether to send
cases to MDL is whether duplicate discovery in similar cases can
thereby be avoided. According to Panel Chair Judge Heyburn, “the
Panel focuses solely upon the potential for convenience,
efficiencies, and fairness in pretrial proceedings centralized before
a single court.”43 One factor is “whether the parties’ legitimate
discovery needs are substantially similar in all of the proposed
transferee actions.”44 Additionally, Judge Heyburn noted:
[T]he Panel looks to whether similar facts are at issue with
respect to the various claims in the different cases. The
40. See Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust
Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621, 622 (1964).
41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (“If actions before the court involved a
common question of law or fact, the court may . . . (2) consolidate the actions.”).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
43. Heyburn, supra note 21, at 2237.
44. Id.
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greater the factual commonality of the cases, the more
likely it is that centralization will benefit the involved
parties and the system as a whole. The more troublesome
dockets to evaluate are those where the potential transferee
cases may contain different groups of plaintiffs or
defendants and may contain some differing legal claims,
yet nevertheless may appear to require similar factual
discovery.45
Discovery schedules established by the transferee court provide
some certainty as to when discovery is completed. Certain patterns
of types of cases remanded due to discovery issues have emerged.
Discovery relating only to individual cases, as opposed to common
issue discovery, may be left to be done in individual cases on
remand. For example pharmaceutical cases may require additional
individualized plaintiff discovery that may be best left for remand,
particularly on such issues as specific causation and damages. On
the other hand, economic loss cases, such as antitrust, securities,
and consumer fraud, are most likely to raise the need for more
MDL-aggregated discovery. However, at least some individualized
discovery may be desirable in the MDL court for purposes of
definitive motions or settlement negotiations. That can sometimes
be accomplished by allowing limited or targeted discovery so that
the parties can assess what the totality of the individualized
discovery would be. The transferee court must exercise its discretion
in determining whether going forward with such discovery prior to
remand would be useful.
B. When All the Common Pretrial Preparation Issues Have Been
Resolved so that the Cases are Ready for Individual Disposition on
Remand
The completion of MDL pretrial preparation occurs when all
the necessary discovery and motions have been done and the cases
are “in a can” to hand over to the transferor courts.
The precedents are clear that a transferee judge has authority
over all proceedings that literally take place “before trial.”46 That
includes dispositive motions—such as motions for dismissal and
summary judgment—and rulings as to evidence and witnesses that

45. Id.
46. In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., MDL No. 1840,
2013 WL 1896985, at *4 (D. Kan. May 6, 2013).

2014]

WHEN REMAND IS APPROPRIATE

465

will affect the trial itself.47 The transferee court’s rulings are law of
the case that are binding on remand for trial unless there are
changed circumstances.48 If transferor judges were permitted to
upset the rulings of transferee judges, the result would be an
undermining of the purpose and usefulness of transfer under
section 1407 for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings
because those proceedings would then lack the finality (at the trial
court level) requisite to the convenience of witnesses and parties
and to the efficient conduct of actions. The transferee judge thus
has considerable discretion in determining what the pretrial issues
are and, if he or she finds it useful, in segmenting them for
disposition before remand.49 The fact that there are so few remands
from MDLs indicates how a transferee MDL judge can often
effectively dispose of pretrial matters so that settlement is likely.
One reason that a transferee judge might decide a particular
issue before trial, rather than leaving it for the remand court, is that
by doing so there will be a uniform ruling applicable to all the
cases on remand. The Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated
Litigation50 and the Chinese Drywall Litigation51 provide examples
of the transferee judge deciding thorny issues of law relating to
such issues as choice of law and defenses. If the cases were
remanded, there might not have been uniform rulings.
A remand need not be total as to the entire case. If a transferee
court retains limited jurisdiction to rule on certain common issues
(which could be on the request of the remand court), certain issues
47. In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 169 F.R.D. 632,
636–37 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding that a transferee judge can limit the number of
trial witnesses).
48. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.133 (4th ed. 2004)
(“Although the transferor judge has the power to vacate or modify rulings made
by the transferee judge, subject to comity and ‘law of the case’ considerations,
doing so in the absence of a significant change of circumstances would frustrate
the purposes of centralized pretrial proceedings.”). For an examination of the
“law of the case” problems that arise in multidistrict litigation, see Joan
Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in Consolidated and Transferred
Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1987).
49. See Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives
and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 691 (2006)
[hereinafter Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation].
50. See, e.g., In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d
644 (E.D. La. 2009); See also Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model For
Resolving Complex Litigation If a Class Action is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2205, 2221 n.80 (2008) [hereinafter Sherman, MDL Model].
51. In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521
(5th Cir. 2014) (ruling on such issues as liability for acts of subsidiary and alter
ego, minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction, and vacation of default
judgment).
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could go back to it later for resolution—for example, to determine
damages on a standard applicable to all cases. This could insure
more uniformity of result among the cases remanded to many
different jurisdictions. Group remands could also take place, for
example, as to all the cases represented by the same law firm when
there is an opportunity for settlement of all those cases or when
there are certain categories of cases that can be settled or disposed
of.
It has been suggested that plaintiffs’ attorneys might oppose
remand unless their attorneys’ fees are determined and awarded in
the MDL court. Assuming that a global settlement has not been
achieved, remand might be partial because a number of dispositive
and other issues have been decided by the MDL judge. In that case,
it would seem appropriate to award attorneys’ fees for the common
benefits conferred on the plaintiffs up to that point. There does not
seem to be any precedent dealing with this issue, no doubt in part
because of the low level of MDL remands.
C. When the Transferee Judge No Longer Believes that a Global
Settlement Is Possible if Remand Is Deferred.
1. The Settlement Responsibility of a Transferee Judge
One of the duties of a transferee judge is to attempt to achieve
settlement.52 The MDL proceeding in federal court can provide a
unique focus for settlement promotion and other pretrial activities.
Since settlement is a primary goal of an MDL judge, that judge
may keep the MDL cases when pretrial matters have been largely
resolved so long as there seems to be momentum towards
settlement. But if there is little hope of settlement, the MDL judge
may move to remand. An expression of intent to remand may also
be used by an MDL judge to stimulate the parties to settle. So the
timing of remand can be tied to ongoing settlement negotiations.
Deference to the transferee judge as to whether the route he or
she is pursuing to achieve settlement is usually accorded. But at
some point, the Panel may decide that successful settlement is
unlikely and call for remand. The asbestos MDL provides a lesson
52. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.132 (4th ed. 2004) (“One
of the values of multidistrict proceedings is that they bring before a single judge
all of the federal cases, parties, and counsel comprising the litigation. They
therefore afford a unique opportunity for the negotiation of a global settlement.
Few cases are remanded for trial; most multidistrict litigation is settled in the
transferee court. As a transferee judge, it is advisable to make the most of this
opportunity and facilitate the settlement of the federal and any related state
cases.”).
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in realizing that MDL aggregation has been unsuccessful, although
the solution there was not to remand the cases to the original
jurisdictions but for the MDL judge to take strict measures through
pretrial motions and the imposition of strict discovery requirements
to weed out many unmeritorious cases.53
The MDL judge necessarily has broad discretion in deciding
whether remand of cases—either individually or in a group—will
serve the interests of the MDL statute. For example, it has been
noted that after a plaintiffs’ steering committee (PSC) is appointed,
a number of remand motions for cases are often filed by attorneys
not selected. There may be myriad reasons for such motions. For
example, a plaintiff’s attorney may fear that his cases will be
caught in “the black hole” of the MDL54 and could be settled or
tried more quickly if remanded. But such partial remands may
reduce the MDL judge’s leverage to obtain a global settlement.
Another (less valid) reason could be that the attorneys not selected
for the PSC are seeking to put pressure on the PSC attorneys or
judge to give them a larger role in the MDL litigation. If that is the
case, the judge might be wary of granting remand because it would
hurt the client who is really not financially able to prosecute his
case apart from the MDL. In short, transferee court decisions to
remand can involve complex considerations weighing such critical
factors as the impact on strategic choices and on the ultimate
success of settlement that are not achieved by a routine rule of
earliest possible remand.
2. Unique Advantages of MDL
MDL has emerged in recent years as an alternative to class
actions for case aggregation. An MDL transferee judge need not
rely on the class action, with its demanding requirements, to
achieve the benefits of aggregation and promote a global
settlement. In fact, in most mass tort cases today, granting of class
certification is unlikely.55 Furthermore, although a federal
transferee judge does not have jurisdiction over related state cases,
settlement negotiations as to the federal cases can be coordinated
with the attorneys in the state cases, and the federal MDL can
serve as a catalyst for a global settlement. As demonstrated in
Vioxx, joint negotiations between lawyers in the state and federal
53. See infra text accompanying notes 68–82.
54. See Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability
Multidistrict Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER
L.J. 97, 126 (2013).
55. See Sherman, MDL Model, supra note 50, at 2208.
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actions, and the collaboration of state judges with the federal MDL
judge, can bridge the jurisdictional divide to accomplish an
aggregate settlement without resort to class actions.56
Another advantage of the MDL process is to enable a global
settlement that encompasses state court cases on the same matter.
There is no similar mechanism in the MDL Act that would permit
transfer of similar cases from state courts. In many mass tort
litigations, there are a sizable number of suits, both individual and
class action, in both federal and state courts. This can result in
certification of conflicting class actions and give rise to
complicated federalism issues as to the power of a federal court to
enjoin the state actions.57 If the federal cases are transferred by the
Panel to a transferee judge, a settlement can only bind the
transferred federal cases if there is a global settlement involving
both the parties and their attorneys from the state courts as well. In
In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation,58 the transferee judge,
Judge Fallon, involved state-court judges with large dockets of
Vioxx cases in settlement discussions.59 More generally, federal
MDL judges may coordinate with state judges presiding over
similar cases. An experienced defense-side lawyer observed that
seeking MDL centralization may be an effective way of persuading
state-court judges to follow the federal leader: “Without an MDL
proceeding, there is no obvious leader among the federal judges
handling federal cases. It can thus be very difficult to convince
state court judges to follow the lead of any one particular federal
judge.”60
The global settlement achieved in the Vioxx MDL included
both the federal MDL suits and state court cases.61 This was
accomplished by requiring plaintiffs’ attorneys who wanted to
participate in the settlement to submit enrollment forms for 100%
of their Vioxx clients within a limited time period. More than 95%
of the attorneys in both the federal and state cases enrolled and
accepted the terms of the settlement. An MDL settlement can bind
56. See, e.g., Sherman, MDL Model, supra note 50; see generally In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. La. 2006).
57. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, Antisuit Injunction and Notice of
Intervention and Preclusion: Complementary Devices to Prevent Duplicative
Litigation, 1995 BYU L. REV. 925, 940–41 (1995).
58. Vioxx, 239 F.R.D. at 450.
59. Sherman, MDL Model, supra note 50, at 2214.
60. Mark Herrmann, To MDL or Not to MDL? A Defense Perspective, 24
LITIGATION 43, 46 (1998).
61. See Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne,
Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2336–37
(2008).
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those parties that agree to it. In Vioxx, the state-court plaintiffs and
their attorneys obviously found the settlement achieved in the
federal MDL to be satisfactory and enrolled within the time
period.62
MDL transferee judges have a number of creative ways to try
to accomplish global settlements. One of the most promising has
been bellwether trials of a small number of representative cases
that are filed (or dismissed and refiled) in the transferee district, as
was done in Vioxx. The information provided to the attorneys
regarding strengths and weaknesses across the spectrum of related
cases helps them to assess the value of the consolidated litigation
and makes possible a more reasoned decision as to an aggregate or
global settlement.
3. A Shift Toward Routine Remand Without Encouragement of
Settlement?
In March 2014, the Louisiana Law Review hosted a Symposium
entitled “The Rest of the Story: Resolving the Cases Remanded by
the MDL.” Professor Elizabeth Chamblee Burch’s article in this
Symposium is an intelligent and spirited critique of delayed remand
of MDL cases and of the role of transferee judges in promoting
settlement.63 The Article urges that early remand become “the
norm” so that adverse consequences of transferee judges holding on
to cases are avoided.64 The adverse consequences are said to include
errors in private, global settlements that are non-appealable; not
having local judges familiar with state laws when state substantive
laws are involved; aggregate settlements that include coercive terms
designed to control stakeholders’ interests at the expense of non-lead
attorneys and plaintiffs; not having jury trials that bring a
community’s diverse perspectives and norms to bear on fact finding;
global settlements that encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to file weak
claims; giving defendants strategic benefits of centralization and
global settlement; and allowing transferee judges to receive selfinterested benefits.
It is not the province of this Article to evaluate all those claims.
Many of them go beyond the issue of remand that is the topic of
62. The settlement also required that 85% of the plaintiffs in pending cases
enroll in order for the settlement to take effect. This has been criticized as
raising “the prospect that consent is less than voluntary.” See Burch, supra note
35, at 14, 16. This is a common requirement insisted on by defendants to insure
that settlement buys genuine peace and that plaintiffs’ attorneys do not cherry
pick strong cases and withhold them from the settlement.
63. See generally Burch, supra note 35.
64. See id. at 413.
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this Symposium to criticize both global settlements and case
aggregation itself. Suffice it to say that a number of the claims do
not seem to be supported under the actual practice of MDL
transferee courts.
Objecting to the encouragement of settlement in MDL, Professor
Burch’s Article asserts that “coaxing settlement strays furthest from a
judge’s adjudicative role.”65 It correctly finds a pro-settlement bias in
both the Panel and transferee judges. However, as reflected in case
precedents applying the Act, as well as the Manual for Complex
Litigation, encouragement of settlement is a primary objective of
MDL practice in the interests of reducing the costs in both time and
money of full-bore individual litigation. The charge that MDL
assignments are “plum judicial assignments” from which transferee
judges receive “self-interested benefits from settling high profile
cases,”66 seems contrary, from my experience, to the performance of
transferee judges who are selected by the Panel for their reputation for
fairness as well as their ability and experience in aiding the parties to
settle.
Professor Burch’s Article sees “evidence that a normative shift
may be underway”67 that will make early remand “routine.”68 As has
been noted, there certainly has been a movement in opposition to case
aggregation and its aspects like delayed remand and promotion of
global settlements. As an extension of the aggregation debate, MDL
has come under attack as a means of avoiding court-imposed
limitations on what some in the defense bar and business see as
excessive settlements. A much narrower issue is whether, as argued in
Professor Burch’s article, the MDL Panel “has abdicated its proper
role” concerning remand and transferee judges should tighten their
standards for ordering remands.69 The Article cites two developments
as indicating a “normative shift”—the investigations of the ABA TIPS
Asbestos Task Force, and the experience of the transferee judges in
the massive asbestos MDL that has been called “a black hole.”
a. The ABA TIPS Asbestos Task Force
The ABA TIPS Task Force,70 after holding hearings, has not as
of the date of publication of this Article, issued its final report and
65. Id. at 416.
66. Id. at 417.
67. Id. at 402.
68. Id. at 422.
69. Id. at 400 (quoting John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern,
Evaluating and Improving the MDL Process, 38 LITIGATION 27, 31 (2012)).
70. The author of this Article is one of the seven members of the Task
Force.

2014]

WHEN REMAND IS APPROPRIATE

471

recommendations.71 The focus of the Task Force was not
deficiencies in the MDL process, remand practice, or global
settlements. The focus was the handling of asbestos cases, and
particularly the issue of discovery of information concerning
payments by the various asbestos trusts and concern over “double
dipping” by claimants.72 The Task Force made no significant
examination of MDL practice other than in the context of the
particular asbestos MDL. The Task Force hearings did not concern
transferee judge practice, global settlements, or time of remand. If
MDL practice is to be examined, it will require a very different
investigation than that of the Task Force.
b. The Asbestos Black Hole Experience
Asbestos litigation is the longest, most expensive mass tort in
U.S. history, involving more than 8,400 defendants and 730,000
claimants as of 2002.73 Asbestos cases were difficult to get
certified as class actions because of the time often required for
medical conditions to manifest themselves and the fact that
plaintiffs were often exposed to many different products under
very individualized circumstances, thus not satisfying the
requirement of “predominance of common questions.”74
After many refusals of courts to certify class actions in asbestos
suits against manufacturers, the Fifth Circuit in 1973 approved class
certification in an asbestos case.75 Over the following decade, a
number of courts, both federal and state, certified asbestos class
actions—often leading to settlements—after the asbestos manufacturer
had gone into bankruptcy. However, the class action solution to the
asbestos crisis was short-lived, and the class action device was
markedly restricted as a means of aggregate disposition of asbestos
cases.
Reacting to what were considered excesses in class action
practice, a number of circuit courts imposed stricter standards for

71. Georgene Vairo, Lessons Learned by the Reporter: Is Disaggregation
the Answer to the Asbestos Mess?, 88 TUL. L. REV. 1039, 1042 (2014).
72. Id. at 1048–49.
73. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION, at vii, xxv, 70
(RAND Corp. 2005).
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (“[T]he questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members. . . .”).
75. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
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class certification, particularly as to mass torts.76 In addition, a
series of Supreme Court decisions severely undercut global
settlements in class actions.77 Given the failure of class actions to
resolve asbestos cases, the MDL device was turned to. “In contrast
to the stringent rules that govern class actions, MDL is a looser and
more flexible structure allowing for transfer and consolidation
based on pragmatic considerations.”78 Also, unlike class actions
where the named plaintiffs are the only formal party and are in a
fiduciary capacity to represent the absent class members, every
plaintiff in an MDL would have to file suit. Thus the issue of
adequate representation of absent persons—who may not even
know of the class action until notice is given upon settlement—is
lessened in MDL’s.
Five times during the late 1970s and 1980s, petitions to
consolidate asbestos cases through MDL transfer were filed.79
However, the Panel did not consolidate the cases, apparently
deferring to the individual federal courts to resolve asbestos
litigation through individual or class dispositions.80 However, the
attempts of the individual courts had not made marked reductions
in the backlogs. In 1991, the Panel gave in and transferred all
76. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995);
In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Castano v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
77. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), the Court
addressed a settlement where twenty asbestos manufacturers reached an
agreement with leading asbestos plaintiff’s lawyers. The settlement was made
on behalf of all persons in the U.S. who had been exposed occupationally to
defendants’ asbestos products. Id. at 602. The settlement included the claims of
persons who had not manifested the disease. Id. at 603. The Supreme Court
found that the attempt to lump all future claimants together in a single class
action violated the class action rule. Id. at 625–27. Among other things, it noted
conflicts of interest between those with presently manifested disease and future
claimants. Id. at 627. In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), the
Supreme Court overturned the certification of a settlement class, finding that
there had been inadequate examination of whether there was in fact a limited
fund. But more importantly, the Court said it was not contemplated that “the
mandatory class action codified in subdivision (b)(1)(b) would be used to
aggregate unliquidated tort claims on a limited fund rationale.” Id. at 843. The
Court also restated the Amchem objections to class actions brought on behalf of
both those with present medical conditions and those with only possible “future”
injuries. Id. at 847. The Amchem and Ortiz decisions effectively brought an end
to attempts to use class actions to craft broad global settlements of asbestos
cases and to resolve future asbestos claims where no injury was manifested or
suit filed.
78. Sherman, MDL Model, supra note 50, at 2209.
79. See generally Edward F. Sherman, The Evolution of Asbestos Litigation,
88 TUL. L. REV. 1021 (2014).
80. Robreno, supra note 54, at 111.
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26,000 asbestos cases pending in federal courts to Judge Charles R.
Weiner in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.81 Judge Weiner
undertook to achieve a global solution, appointing a steering
committee of prominent plaintiffs’ lawyers who negotiated a
global settlement with a group of twenty companies.82 That
settlement was rejected by the Supreme Court in Amchem Products
Inc. v. Windsor.83 Thus, after many years of encouraging a global
settlement, the MDL process was left with having to try other
methods. The asbestos MDL cases were ultimately transferred to
Judge Eduardo C. Robreno of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
after the death of Judge Weiner. Judge Robreno noted that “[t]his
stage of the litigation led some litigants to refer to MDL-875 as a
‘black hole,’ where cases disappeared forever from the active
dockets of the court.”84 Perversely, a reduction in the backlog of
cases was aided by plaintiffs’ lawyers avoiding federal court and
filing instead in state courts. Judge Robreno eschewed aggregate or
global approaches. In 2009, he dismissed thousands of cases based
on the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with his administrative order
requiring filing of reports and other discovery materials.85 He also
suggested to the MDL Panel that no more tag-along cases (suits
filed after the original MDL transfer) be sent to him.86
Judge Robreno has considerably reduced the federal MDL
docket, applying strict schedules and weeding out many cases for
insufficient proof of harm or exposure thus reducing the bargaining
power of plaintiff’s inventory lawyers. On the other hand, from a
plaintiff’s perspective, there is a concern that meritorious cases
have also been caught up in this drive. Some state court asbestos
case dockets have also been reduced in states where an MDL-like
court was created for transfer of asbestos cases.87

81. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 424
(J.P.M.L. 1991).
82. Robreno, supra note 54, at 112–13. The settlement also established the
Center for Claims Resolution (CCR) with a claims process for determining
whether the eligibility of class members for payments, that also included
alternative dispute resolution features.
83. See supra note 76.
84. Robreno, supra note 54, at 111.
85. Id. at 137–38. Called “Lone Pine orders,” many courts require the
submission of specifics as to exposure and medical history early in asbestos
litigation. Id. at 138.
86. Id. at 185.
87. Vairo, supra note 71, at 1056. Judge Mark Davidson, who was assigned
all the Texas asbestos cases, testified before the Asbestos Task Force concerning
use of similar techniques such as setting tight schedules for presentation of
supporting evidence by plaintiffs. Id. at 1058–59.
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The asbestos MDL experience is sui generis. The vast number
of cases, individualized issues, bankruptcy of the principal
manufacturers, and difficulty of weeding out non-severe and nonmeritorious cases were distinctive. The MDL experience proved
that attempts by the earlier transferee judges to dispose of the cases
through settlements were inadequate, and it was Judge Robreno’s
imposition of strict schedules and pretrial demands for supporting
evidence that began to shrink the backlog. Far from demonstrating
that transferee judges hold on to cases too long and refuse to
remand, that experience was resolved by the transferee court itself
and not by remanding back to the transferor courts. The fact is that
the “shift” claimed to be taking place in remand practice is not
supported by either the ABA Task Force investigation or the
asbestos MDL experience.
CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, transferee courts to whom the Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation transfers cases for MDL treatment are
required to remand cases upon the completion of pretrial proceedings.
Just when that should occur is subject to dispute. Both courts and the
Panel have favored using a variety of techniques to permit transferee
courts to hold on to cases when, in their discretion, there is still a
chance of resolution through motions or settlement. The primary
categories in which immediate remand has been avoided are
considered and evaluated: when common-issue discovery is
completed; when all the common pretrial preparation issues have been
resolved so that the cases are ready for individual disposition on
remand; and when the transferee judge believes that a global
settlement is no longer possible if remand is deferred. A movement in
recent years has called for earlier remand and, in particular, that
transferee judges not keep cases even if there is a possibility of
resolution or settlement. The investigations of the ABA TIPS Task
Force on Asbestos and the asbestos MDL “black hole” experience
indicate that actions by transferee judges in setting tight schedules and
requiring proof of such elements as exposure and harm can be
effective as opposed to early and routine remand. Successes in
achieving global settlements in such MDL cases as Vioxx provide
support for continuing to give transferee judges broad discretion as to
the timing of remand.

